

The 1914 cleansing of Aegean Greeks as a case of violent Turkification

MATTHIAS BJØRNLUND

In 1992, Greek historian Ioannis Hassiotis wrote that “[i]t is strange that both Greek and Armenian historians should have treated the first persecutions of the Greeks in 1913–14 and the Armenian Genocide of 1915 as separate phenomena.”¹ The tendency to treat as separate phenomena various aspects of CUP policies of what I would dub “violent Turkification”—interconnected policies of, for example, ethnic cleansing and genocide aimed at the homogenization of the Ottoman Empire—is not new, nor can it merely be seen in the writings of Greek and Armenian scholars. Before, during, and after WWI, the wide range of mainly Western diplomats, missionaries, etc. in the empire would primarily witness and report on the specific aspect of CUP policies that was the Armenian genocide—a fact that has often been reflected in scholarly accounts that have likewise tended to focus on this event rather than on the persecution of other groups.² Two main reasons for this seem to be that: (1) before, during, and after the Armenian genocide many such observers (especially missionaries) worked among Armenians rather than among, for example, Greeks or Assyrians; and (2) these observers were therefore generally more receptive to the suffering of those they had often literally built their lives around, and were placed at geographical locations where they could mainly observe the destruction of the Armenians. A third reason is that many saw the Armenian genocide, with its widespread, large-scale, and systematic massacres and death marches, as more condensed in time and more radical in its intent and execution than other campaigns of destruction.

But a number of observers did see other non-Turkish groups as targets of CUP policies and would view these policies as connected. To name a few examples: in the Ottoman Senate, Ahmed Riza would during WWI, as the only high-level and vocal Turkish voice of dissent, criticize the persecution of Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs and the confiscation of their property.³ Danish diplomatic minister at Constantinople, Carl Ellis Wandel, reported on how the CUP would use extermination to bring a stop to what they considered as Arab, Armenian, and Greek domination in the Ottoman parliament that would lead to their loss of power.⁴ George E. White suggested that the purpose of the CUP was to “create a uniform state, one in Turkish nationality, and one in Moslem orthodoxy”

through deportation of Armenians and Greeks and suppression of the “unorthodox” Alevi.⁵ Member of the *American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief*, William Walker Rockwell, stated that the number of Armenians and Syrians had been severely decimated as a result of CUP policies and that there had been “awful misery among the Palestinian Jews.”⁶ H. F. Ulrichsen, MP, member of the organization *Danish Friends of Armenians*,⁷ and secretary to Wandel 1914–16, contended that the CUP and the Kemalist “‘cleansing policy’ [‘Udrensningspolitik’] [...] had as its aim the removal of all the foreign bodies—Christians and Jews—which were influencing Turkey to such a large degree.”⁸

Such views have now begun to be reflected by researchers of the CUP and early Kemalist periods who emphasize the role of “ethnic reconfiguration”⁹ or “demographic engineering,”¹⁰ the planned, interconnected, and proactive (as opposed to “accidental,” isolated, or reactive) elements of these policies. While Turkish historiography has traditionally denied or downplayed such policies, these scholars, whether or not they use the “g”-word, now suggest that the Armenian genocide was an aspect of a policy of Turkification, albeit usually described as its most extremely violent aspect.¹¹ According to Taner Akcam, the CUP had prior to WWI “formulated a policy that they began to execute in the Aegean region against the Greeks and, during the war years, expanded to include the Assyrians, the Chaldeans, the Syrians, and especially the Armenians, a policy that eventually became genocidal. [...] Detailed reports were prepared [by the Special Organization] outlining the elimination of the Christian population. These measures were implemented in the Aegean region in the spring of 1914.”¹² This study aims to take a closer look at these pre-war persecutions of Aegean Greeks as an aspect of violent Turkification, i.e. as more than an isolated (series of) incident(s) with little or no relation to other instances of CUP group persecution or to any overall CUP goal of Turkification. The sources consist of published reports, memoirs, etc., and scholarly works, with an emphasis on unpublished Danish archival material that supplements existing knowledge of the events.

The beginnings of violent Turkification

Seen from the vantage point of observers in the major harbour city of Smyrna (Izmir), and in Constantinople (Istanbul), the Ottoman capital, CUP policies of group persecution began in earnest with the attempted ethnic cleansing of Ottoman Greeks living along the Aegean littoral.¹³ Attempts at removing non-Turkish influences from the economy had been initiated by the CUP after a radical faction of the Committee had gained power in 1913, and this policy was supplemented with the cleansing of more than 100,000 Greeks from the Aegean and Thrace in the spring and summer of 1914.¹⁴ Papers reported that thousands of Greeks in Thrace were forced by the authorities to embark for Greece or convert to Islam,¹⁵ and that Greeks from around Rodosto were reported to be suffering on the fields and roads while Muslim Albanians and Cretans were installed in their houses.¹⁶ This was apparently the result of careful deliberations and preliminary research by the CUP, though it was decided to hide the connection

between, on the one hand, the CUP and government agencies like the Ministry of War, and, on the other hand, the Special Organization (SO) that executed of the operation.¹⁷

The main “Danish” witness to these events, Alfred van der Zee, Danish consul at Smyrna, *vilayet* of Aidin (Smyrna) since 1910, was in fact Dutch.¹⁸ He was born in the Netherlands, May 9, 1872, a businessman running the local offices of the family business *W. F. van der Zee*, and who spoke Dutch, English, French, Italian, German, Greek, and Turkish.¹⁹ Also, he was a shipbroker and an agent for the Danish shipping company *DFDS*.²⁰ Vice consul at the Danish consulate in Smyrna at the time was Dutch Levantine John Atkinson de Jongh who had held this position since 1877.²¹ In June 1914, Van der Zee reported to Wandel, his superior in Constantinople, that a large-scale, systematic, and violent banishing of “the generally peaceful and hard-working Greeks” was carried out on the orders of the central government.²²

This policy was partly dictated by perceived security concerns. The CUP believed the Ottoman Greeks to be suspect on account of their alleged ties to the Greek state, and, more specifically, they wanted to avoid that Greeks living along the coastline could come to serve as a fifth column. The danger was believed to be imminent as Greece, through the intervention of the European Powers, had recently come to control the nearby islands of Chios and Mytilene (Lesbos). These islands, it was stated, could be used to launch attacks.²³ Also, the persecution of Aegean (Ionian) Greeks could serve to put pressure on the Greek government to solve the overall islands dispute in a manner beneficial to the Ottoman government.²⁴ But the islands dispute and security concerns were apparently not the only reasons, as economic, political, and ethno-religious concerns seem to have made the cleansing policy part of a larger project of Turkification. Van der Zee reported that in March 1914, the *valis* of Smyrna and the nearby regions had made inspection tours to the coastal towns and villages of the *vilayets*, “advising” the local officials to force out the Greeks:

About three months ago the Governor General of Smyrna [*vali* Rahmi Bey], acting, as I understand, on instructions from the Ministry, made an inspection in the small towns situated on the coast of this province. It would appear that in the course of this *tournee administrative* he gave semi-official orders to the sub-governors to force the Greek population resident therein to evacuate these towns. No order of expulsion was decreed, but the Turkish officials were to make use of tortuous and vexatious measures so well-known to them. The like instructions were, I understand, given by the Governors of the other maritime provinces.²⁵

This general interpretation is supported by Hans-Lukas Kieser, who quotes the memoirs of Mahmut Celal Bey (Bayar), head of the Smyrna cell of the CUP in 1914, and later to become Turkey’s third president: “[...] CUP and the ministry of war, run by [Enver Pasha] since 3 January 1914, were, parallel to the regular activities of the government, working towards the liquidation of the ‘concentrations of non-Muslims’ in the Aegean region [...]”²⁶ According to Wandel, it was Dr Nazim Bey, leading member of the inner circle of the CUP that would later orchestrate the Armenian genocide,²⁷ who during the Balkan Wars 1912–13 had

developed a plan to settle Muslims, who had themselves been violently cleansed from Macedonia, at various places in the empire from where non-Muslims would be deported.²⁸ The Ottoman diplomatic minister at Athens, Galip Kemali (Söylemezoglu), even proposed to the Greek authorities that the Muslims of the Greek administrative provinces of Macedonia and Epirus should be exchanged with the rural Greek population of the Smyrna province and Ottoman Thrace. Greek Prime Minister Venizelos seemingly approved of such an exchange around the time of the 1914 cleansing operation, on condition that it would be voluntary and that the persecution and forced migration of Greeks would cease.²⁹

The outbreak of WWI prevented the exchange, but even before that the authorities, represented by the ministry of interior's Office of Tribal and Refugee Settlement, had decided not to wait for the consent of the Greek government.³⁰ So, in 1914, the plan was initiated in earnest in a decidedly violent and involuntary manner that has been compared to the Nazi policy of "Aryanization"—defined as the "reorganization of economic resources in favour of 'ethnically-desirable' citizens and therefore of the ethnically-defined state itself."³¹ For the CUP, to be "ethnically-desirable" meant to be Turkish as well as Muslim, as from 1914 onward, non-Turkish Muslims (e.g. Kurds) deported to areas previously occupied by Christians were supposed to assimilate (i.e. Turkify) by giving up their ethnic identity.³² Discriminatory policies had already been directed against Christians. The electoral system, for instance, was designed to discriminate heavily against Christians, and the authorities, despite their promises, did not return Anatolian land to Armenians driven away during or after the Abdul Hamid massacres.³³

Immediately after the 1913 coup, the new, more radical CUP leadership tried to give the appearance that they continued efforts to "Ottomanize" and centralize the empire in a peaceful and democratic manner. But, as Wandel and other observers noted, if this had ever in reality been CUP policy it was no longer the case.³⁴ Rather, as Feroz Ahmad puts it, repression and violence became the order of the day.³⁵ Although Wandel acknowledged that the extent of the radicalization was partly caused by events outside CUP control, he emphasized that it was not simply the result of defensive *ad hoc* measures against, say, Western imperialism, but an integral part of an active, deliberate policy rooted in Turkist supremacist beliefs that basically had as its goal to preserve power. Since it was no longer believed that this could be reached by a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, Turkish-dominated empire, it would be reached by somehow creating a "Turkey for the Turks," economically, politically, linguistically, and ethnically, increasingly combined with an expansionist pan-Turkist vision of a Turkish Empire uniting ethnic Turks from Asia and Russia.³⁶

Wandel accordingly described the nature of the CUP by describing its members not as great idealists or statesmen, but as organizers using every means to further their organization, fighting for power rather than ideals: "For some there is no doubt about their integrity, but it is the general understanding that [the CUP] will continue to pursue the policy it has already initiated, a policy which has led to so many conflicts." He believed that this policy would eventually lead to "national suicide."³⁷ In fact, though the costs were immense, it was an important

step leading to the creation of the relatively homogeneous, if unstable, nation that is the modern Turkish republic.³⁸ But, as Wandel also emphasized, although many Young Turks were not “great idealists,” they did share some broad ideals that, if nothing else, served to legitimize their power monopoly in particular and of ethnic Turks in general, as well as to prevent the disintegration of the empire through centralization and homogenization.³⁹

The nation, beginning with the areas of trade and language, was to be cleansed from “foreign elements” in order to establish a national culture and economy.⁴⁰ It was nation-building through marginalization or destruction of the non-Turkish components of first and foremost the age-old Anatolian multicultural make-up, a process that required the rewriting of history and the definition of non-Turks as the Other.⁴¹ In a lengthy report, Wandel described how it was only after the CUP dictatorship had come to power that Turkish shops in Constantinople would advertise that “This is a Muslim Business.”⁴² Not all Christians were “loyal,” but according to the diplomat, while Christians were generally opposed to the CUP system of centralization and to the principle “Turkey for the Turks,” they saw it as necessary to work with the CUP rather than to break with it when it came to improving their living conditions.⁴³ This was despite the fact that the Christians of the empire were subjected to what Wandel describes as a repressive and xenophobic regime which systematically discriminated against them.⁴⁴

From boycott to violent persecution

As noted, the 1914 cleansing was initially attempted through a severe economic boycott and by other intimidating measures.⁴⁵ As Van der Zee saw it, the Aegean region was already sparsely populated and had plenty of arable soil, with ample room for Muslim settlers even if the authorities had chosen not to expel the Greeks.⁴⁶ So in the sense that the cleansing was part of an economic project, it was carried out as a means of creating a national economy dominated by Turks/Muslims—political logic overtook economic concerns during the 1910s, as it has been put.⁴⁷ The aim of economic Turkification was to create a class dominated by Turks or Turkified Muslims who were perceived by the CUP (and later by the Kemalists) as loyal, not only because of their ethno-religious traits, but because they owed their position to those who had “removed the competition.” Christian entrepreneurs, on the other hand, had gained a degree of independence and had become a perceived obstacle, not just because of their ethnicity and religion, but because of their perceived membership of an economic class that was seen as having a limited allegiance to the state.⁴⁸

Inga Nalbandian, a Danish writer and newspaper correspondent married to Mardiros Nalbandian, an Armenian scholar from Galata, reported from Constantinople that “agents” would walk into the ladies’ compartment on the Bosphorus ferry and warn Muslim women not to buy from Christians. She also reported that this was a small part of a large, chauvinist campaign that drove many Christians to ruin. For instance, at the Constantinople University, all three Greek professors had

been fired without warning or cause, together with three out of five Armenian professors. Nalbandian stated on this policy:

It is a whole wave that comes and goes, the reason for the boycott is two-sided. The adoption of “the reforms in Asia Minor” [the recent reforms imposed by the Western powers affecting the Ottoman Armenian *vilayets*, MB]—the red cape dangling in front of the eyes of the Turkish bull—must be punished, and punished severely, and since it is considered too dangerous to initiate an unconcealed massacre, the Armenians must be struck in a pecuniary manner. And regarding the Greeks—the Ottoman Greeks, that is—the still unsolved island question plays a large role; furthermore, one must add the bitter grudge held by the Turks, and not least by the all powerful Enver Pasha and through him the whole government, against the Ottoman Greeks, as there are among these to be found a number of rich men who have given and still give large sums to the Greek navy.⁴⁹

But when the boycott did not have the desired effect—“[as] the *rayah* [‘cattle’] Greeks clung, however, to their fields,” as Van der Zee expressed it⁵⁰—the cleansing of Greeks was attempted by violent persecution. As the consul reported June 19, 1914:

After open hints that it would be advisable for them to leave [Adramyt, MB], menaces that they would be done to death were resorted to, and finally the threats began to take shape in the murder of villagers returning from their fields and the waylaying of townsmen. A reign of terror was instituted and the panic stricken Greeks fled as fast as they could to the neighbouring island of Mitylene. Soon the movement spread to Kemer, Kilissekeuy, Kinick, Pergamos and Soma. Armed *bashibozuks* [Turkish irregular troops, MB] attacked the people residing therein, lifted the cattle, drove them from their farms and took forcible possession thereof. The details of what took place [are] harrowing, women were seduced, girls were ravished, some of them dying from the ill-treatment received, children at the breast were shot or cut down with their mothers.⁵¹

These *bashibozuks*, alternatively called “Turkish gangs” or *chetes* in the reports, numbered 8–10,000 in the *vilayet* of Aidin alone, and were according to Van der Zee financed and run by the state.⁵² Many of these gangs consisted of members of the SO and radicalized Muslim refugees from the Balkans or the Caucasus, the so-called *muhadjirs*,⁵³ who plundered and murdered “as many of the hated Greeks as possible.”⁵⁴ Subsequently, the gangs also attacked non-Ottoman Greek citizens and their property in a systematic fashion, and the justification given by the authorities could indicate that the operation was not simply meant as a security measure, but had an ideological, not to say xenophobic, rationale: “let foreigners go and buy farms in their own lands.”⁵⁵ Hans-Lukas Kieser contends that to the CUP, the cleansing was also “retaliation for the evil which, according to them, the Muslims under Greek domination had been suffering since the Balkan Wars.”⁵⁶ As the Danish paper *København*, June 17, 1914, reported, after these wars, Greek “administrative harassment” had caused tens of thousands of Muslims to leave their homes.⁵⁷ Both the CUP and at least a sizeable number of the *muhadjirs* had thus become radicalized to the point of becoming anti-Christian, and although the Christians they now persecuted

belonged to populations that had lived in Anatolia for several thousand years, they were now not only designated as “infidel,” but also as “foreigners.”⁵⁸

Ayhan Aktar describes the events in the Aegean region as “tension manifesting itself in hostile mob behaviour and a more nationalistic state bureaucracy [. . .],”⁵⁹ but fails to see a connection between these manifestations. But according to Kuscubasi Esref, an SO leader, the cleansing was indeed a planned event. He quoted Enver Pasha saying on February 23, 1914 that non-Muslims had to be got rid of as they had proven that they did not support the continued existence of the state, and that the salvation of the state was linked to stern measures against them.⁶⁰ And the Russian consul-general at Smyrna, Andrew D. Kalmykow, recalled a talk he had around this time with Interior Minister Talaat Pasha in the presence of Rahmi Bey. According to Kalmykow, the following exchange took place between Rahmi and Talaat: “‘What can I do?’ asked the vali with a smile. ‘We have sent Turkish farmers to colonize the coast, but the Greek peasants simply won’t stay with them and move away of their own free will.’ ‘No, Rahmi,’ said Talaat Pasha, ‘the Greeks cannot remain. They are forced to leave. They must go.’”⁶¹

The massacre of Phoecea, north of the city of Smyrna, that began on the night of June 12 was one of the worst attacks of the campaign. After having looted the villages south of Menemen, causing the Greeks to flee, the *bashibozuks* attacked the town of Phoecea from three sides—according to Van der Zee, they were assisted by Cretans working at the salt depots, referring to Muslim Cretans who had previously migrated or been expelled.⁶² On June 25, the consul quoted an eyewitness of the destruction of the town:

[W]ithin a quarter of an hour after the assault had begun every boat in the place was full of people trying to get away and when no more boats could be had the inhabitants sought refuge on the little peninsula on which the lighthouse stands. I saw eleven bodies of men and women lying dead on the shore. How many were killed I could not say, but trying to get into a house of which the door stood ajar I saw two other dead bodies lying in the entrance hall. Every shop in the place was looted and the goods that could not be carried away were wantonly destroyed.⁶³

The authorities apparently tried to cover up the assault, but after two days a French steam tug boat arriving at Smyrna conveyed the news.⁶⁴ The crew had observed a large number of people on the promontory and sailed some 700 “half starved wretches” to Mytilene. The authorities there sent boats to rescue the remaining 5–6,000 to the island.⁶⁵ According to French eyewitness Manciet, the town of 8–9,000 ethnic Greeks and ca. 400 Turks was methodically destroyed and plundered by well-armed bands, and although the Smyrna authorities sent regular troops to Phoecea, ostensibly to restore order, these soldiers continued to destroy the town. Manciet expressed the belief that the *bashibozuks* were organized and armed by the authorities to expel the Christians.⁶⁶ The simultaneous attacks on the Greeks of the Kara Bournou peninsula, which coincided with the landing of 600 *muhadjir* families at Kato-Panayia and with the landing of a number of other such families at Chesmé who were to replace the Greeks of Alatsata, also

indicate that a major, organized, and effective anti-Greek campaign took place.⁶⁷ Greeks fled the region in their tens of thousands to avoid looting and murder, while the *muhadjirs* were assisted by local authorities in driving them out and taking over their properties.⁶⁸

For instance, Ayhan Aktar describes how the Greeks of the coastal town of Chesmé, opposite the island of Chios, fled immediately after Hilmi Uran was appointed local governor of the town in May 1914: “just a few days after [Uran’s] arrival, the Greek community in and around Cesme started to panic and arranged the means of transport to the nearest island, Chios. Nearly forty thousand Greeks migrated in two weeks.”⁶⁹ The timing could be a coincidence, but it seems more likely that it points to the organized nature of the cleansing, with local officials being appointed by the central authorities to carry out the project. This was seemingly also the case when in June 1913, radical Young Turk Mehmed Reshid, an ardent nationalist with a religiously and racially inspired hatred of Christians, was hastily installed as *mutessarif* of the northern Aegean sub-province of Karesi where he dedicated himself to the expulsion of Greeks.⁷⁰ As for Chesmé, the Greeks fled so fast that their homes and possessions were left largely intact. As local governor, it was Uran’s responsibility to arrange for the orderly redistribution of Greek property, but before he could fulfil his task it was plundered by locals or by *muhadjirs* arriving from Salonica.⁷¹

Generally, the *bashibozuks* seem to have met little resistance, but at the village of Serekieuy in the Menemen district, Greeks formed an armed resistance resulting in fierce fighting lasting for four hours until the defenders ran out of ammunition. Then the villagers, outnumbered and outgunned, fought a hand-to-hand combat until they were killed.⁷² A few managed to escape to the nearby town of Menemen, but as this had some 20,000 inhabitants, the *bashibozuks* shot any inhabitants who left the town but did not dare to attempt an outright attack. This could point to the fact that even though Turkification through persecution was CUP policy, it was a policy that, at this point at least, could not be followed too openly or with any widespread use of regular military forces.⁷³ Stealth, “plausible denial,” and political concerns outweighed the desire to cleanse the area completely. Still, it is estimated that some 150–200,000 Ottoman Greeks left their homes before the outbreak of WWI, either by direct force or, as it is put, “voluntarily,” i.e. by threats of force.⁷⁴

1914: denial and significance

Despite attempts to keep the cleansing a secret and to deny both the existence of and the responsibility for it, the Ottoman government soon had to change course, especially under pressure from France. Also, the persecutions generated anger and bitterness in Greece, which proceeded to mobilize its forces, as did the Ottoman Empire, but the CUP were aware that they were not ready for the war that many believed would break out if the cleansing did not stop.⁷⁵ For instance, in an interview with a Danish paper in June 1914, Greek King Constantine I stated that peace could not be upheld as long as the persecution of the Greeks was

continuing.⁷⁶ In the Danish paper *Nationaltidende*, April 26, 1914, it was reported that the Greek consul at Smyrna had tried to approach Rahmi in order to clarify the matter of the expulsions, but had received the answer that he “had left for the countryside.”⁷⁷ After consultations with the Austrian ambassador at Constantinople, Johann Pallavicini, Wandel was convinced that although neither Greece nor the empire were ready for war, such a war was inevitable in the near future, and he was also convinced that the Anatolian Greeks would then be worse off than ever before.⁷⁸ This prediction was accurate, since during WWI even more violent persecutions of Greeks took place on a regular basis.⁷⁹ And in June 1917, Greece did finally join the war against the empire and her allies.

Regarding a developing CUP policy of denial, the official reactions to the 1914 events point toward aspects of the contemporary (as well as the present) denial of, for example, the Armenian genocide: the claim that the government, when it came to killings and persecution, had no control of local officials or of the designated killer gangs, and the attempts to apply damage control through cover-ups, shifting of blame, and propaganda. Talaat declared in June 1914 that the “regrettable incidents” in the Smyrna region happened because many local officials still believed that the orders they received from the government to protect the Greek population had been issued under pressure from the Great Powers, i.e. not issued in earnest.⁸⁰ Thus, according to Talaat, all responsibility for wrongdoings rested with Rahmi Bey. American ambassador at Constantinople, Henry Morgenthau, related that Talaat would not admit that government officials were entirely responsible for what he called “uprisings.” This, incidentally, could be an implicit recognition of the fact that officials bore the main responsibility for these events.⁸¹

Talaat even went on what Van der Zee calls a “farcical tour” of the towns and cities of the Smyrna region, making speeches promising complete security while local Greeks had to stay at home to avoid being beaten up or shot.⁸² According to a telegram from Talaat to the Porte, sent during his stay in Smyrna, the court martial in the city had sentenced 47 persons to three to five year prison terms for plundering Greek property. This could indicate that the Interior Minister wanted to send a message that the anti-Greek persecutions were, officially at least, not, or no longer, acceptable. At the same time it was reported that two Greeks were to stand trial since they allegedly had made Greeks leave the country by spreading rumours of Turkish massacres.⁸³ Talaat also claimed that Greeks from the region of Chesmé had left voluntarily and that they had not been attacked at any point.⁸⁴ It is not possible from these sources to determine whether Talaat at this point really had decided that the campaign inaugurated under his auspices now had to be terminated or put on hold, but Van der Zee saw no reason to trust the authorities:

To add one more act to this pitiable farce the Imperial Government applied for the delegates [drogmans, i.e. interpreters representing the major foreign embassies, MB] to show civilised Europe that the work of the restitution is sincerely carried on and it is now promenading these gentlemen in motor cars & special trains, giving them good dinners and fine wines, while the victims of its atrocities are begged their bread or living on the charity eked out to them. What these representatives of the Great Powers will have to tell them I know not but, in any case, one thing is absolutely certain: that whatever their report is the tyrannous measures will not

cease, though they may be carried on less openly, as the communication of the Grand Vizier to the American Companies here conclusively proves. In his communication to the Singer Co. at Smyrna the United [States] Consul General Horton says that “he is instructed by [his] Ambassador to inform it that he has obtained the promise of the Grand Vizier that for two months the Greek employees will not be molested but that at the expiration of that time they must be replaced.”⁸⁵

The consul’s (perhaps incorrect) assessment of the drogman’s mission was shared by British ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Louis Mallet, who told Morgenthau that the European Powers were going to “whitewash” the empire as it did not suit them to have a war now.⁸⁶

While it was officially claimed that only 1,000 Greeks had left the empire and that they had done so of their own free will and against the wishes of the authorities,⁸⁷ the Ottoman press acknowledged that persecution, albeit allegedly of an unauthorized nature, was widespread. According to Wandel, *Tanin* reported that while a gang of 8–10,000 robbers were continuing their violent acts around Smyrna, the government had taken precautions that would undoubtedly restore order.⁸⁸ Another official paper, *Tercüman-i Hakikat*, claimed that the powers, by not explicitly denouncing Ottoman policies regarding Greece and the Ottoman Greeks, actually applauded the empire’s attitude.⁸⁹ Whether or not this was true mattered perhaps less than the fact that Turkish nationalists felt somewhat encouraged by the lack of forceful outside intervention—after all, neither Greece nor any other nation turned out to be willing to enter a war against the Ottoman Empire to aid a persecuted minority.

But Ottoman papers also tried to give the impression that Greece or Greeks in general were equally responsible for the “incidents,” as when they reported on what they described as Greek bands of robbers that used Aegean islands as bases for raids. This claim may be exaggerated if one considers that *Stamboul* exemplified it by quoting a telegram relating an incident about a boat with three Greek robbers who had presumably shot at persons near Chesmé.⁹⁰ There is no evidence, however, that Wandel, any more than Van der Zee, found the official propaganda trustworthy. Wandel was satisfied with the consul’s reports on the cleansing of the Greeks, as was expressed in a letter to the consul. Here, Wandel mentioned the June 19 and 25 reports that, he emphasized, contrary to regular procedure had been sent directly to the Danish Foreign Ministry.⁹¹

Concluding remarks

In 1914, the aim of Turkification was not to exterminate but to expel as many Greeks of the Aegean region as possible as not only a “security measure,” but as an extension of the policy of economic and cultural boycott, while at the same time creating living space for the *muhadjirs* that had been driven out of their homes under equally brutal circumstances.⁹² This policy was informed by a radically exclusionist political ideology that has been aptly defined by Aktar, albeit he seems to apply it to a post-WWI context: “The turkification programme can [...] be defined in practice as a set of policies aimed at establishing the

unconditional supremacy of Turkish ethnic identity in nearly all aspects of social and economic life.”⁹³ Wandel believed that the losses resulting from the persecutions were irreparable, since “an industrious class of people have been expelled, despite that the province was already thinly populated. It can be predicted that the province will suffer from the results of this failed policy for years to come.”⁹⁴ This view is still shared by scholars today when assessing the consequences of the virtual disappearance of Christians from Asia Minor.⁹⁵ But the possibilities created for Muslims to take over where they left by becoming entrepreneurs themselves; the practical experiences of ethnic cleansing; the general impunity of the perpetrators; and the relative political “success” of the cleansing—tens of thousands of Greeks fleeing, leaving their homes and possessions to be taken over by Muslim refugees⁹⁶—meant that even more radical measures could be seen as not only possible, but as yet another extension of a policy of social engineering through Turkification. Besides, as Talaat told Morgenthau during the Armenian genocide, “We care nothing about the commercial loss.”⁹⁷

To the CUP, one of the major advantages of Turkification was that the European Powers would be presented with a *fait accompli*. The Christians would be gone who had served as an excuse for interference with what the CUP regarded as the internal matters of the empire. The 1914 cleansing policy therefore points toward the WWI policies of extermination, if not in the sense that these policies were planned to be parts of a “grand scheme” of what have been called partial and total genocides, then in the sense that they were connected in profound ways.⁹⁸ One should not ignore aspects such as the differences between the intent and execution of the 1914 events and the Armenian genocide, or that the late Ottoman Empire was in a difficult situation that could lead to decisions affecting non-Turkish groups that were dictated more by circumstances than by commitment to the principle of Turkification. But there is evidence to suggest that these anti-Greek and Armenian policies to a large degree resulted from closely linked “rational” and xenophobic deliberations that were inherently genocidal.⁹⁹ There were institutional links, from the CUP over the Office of Tribal and Refugee Settlement to the Special Organization. There were more or less rudimentary ideological links—“Turkey for the Turks,” the identification of the “inner enemy” (Greeks, Armenians) with the “outer enemy” (Greece, the Entente). There were economic links, as the disappearance of “Christian competition” could presumably pave the way for a national Turkish/Muslim economy.¹⁰⁰ And there were individual links, perhaps most strikingly personified in the abovementioned Mehmed Reshid. In 1914 he was involved with the cleansing of Greeks, while he directed the extermination of Armenians and Assyrians in the Diarbekir region in 1915–16.¹⁰¹ Lewis Einstein, of the US Constantinople embassy, wrote in his diary May 1, 1915 that even when threatened militarily on all sides during WWI, the Ottoman government was bent on breaking the remnants of an alleged political opposition: “They have crushed the Turkish opposition, they expelled the Greeks, and now is the Armenians’ turn [...]”¹⁰² Wandel believed that the reason for the CUP for such acts was basically to preserve power by

any means, for themselves in particular and for Turks in general.¹⁰³ But power can be gained or preserved through a number of means, and evidence suggests that the CUP rather consistently chose means that involved group persecution or destruction, leading to the perhaps most important link between the fates of Greeks and Armenians: the almost complete disappearance of both groups from Ottoman/Turkish soil.

Notes and References

- 1 Ioannis K. Hassiotis, "The Armenian genocide and the Greeks: response and records (1915–1923)," in: Richard G. Hovanissian, ed., *The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics*, p 135 (London: Macmillan, 1992).
- 2 For an interesting exception, see the review essay by James J. Reid, "Necrophilia and alienation, or *death and exile*," *Journal of the Society for Armenian Studies*, Vol 9, 1996–97, pp 105–123.
- 3 UM, 139. D. 1., "Tyrkiæt—Indre Forhold," pk. 2, No CLXXV, 20/12, 1917. See also Ayhan Aktar, "Debating the Armenian massacres in the last Ottoman parliament, November–December 1918," *History Workshop Journal*, Vol 64, 2007, p 260.
- 4 UM, 139. N. 1., "Armenien," No LIV, 10/3, 1916.
- 5 George E. White, "Some non-conforming Turks," *Moslem World*, Vol 8, No 3, 1918, p 248, quoted in Hans-Lukas Kieser, "Some remarks on Alevi responses to the Missionaries in Eastern Anatolia (19th–20th cc.)," 2000, available at <http://www.hist.net/kieser/pu/responses.html> (accessed December 2005).
- 6 "The total of Armenian and Syrian dead," *Current History Magazine*, November 1916.
- 7 On this organization, see Matthias Bjørnlund, "Karen Jeppe, Aage Meyer Benedictsen, and the Ottoman Armenians: national survival in imperial and colonial settings," *Haigazian Armenological Review*, forthcoming.
- 8 *Armeniervennen*, Vol 5, Nos 1–2, 1925, p 5. Ulrichsen visited the empire/Turkey for substantial periods of time in 1919 and 1924: UM, 2-0355, "Konstantinopel/Istanbul, diplomatisk representation," "Kopibog 1914–1921," No 13, 7/4, 1919; *Armeniervennen*, Vol 5, Nos 1–2, 1925, pp 4–5. On the 1924 visit, he wrote (*ibid*, p 5) that "[t]housands of wealthy Greeks had left Constantinople in a hurry when they heard about the fate of their compatriots in Smyrna. Other thousands had been left without work, simply because they were Christians. The Young Turks demand that all citizens were equal in the eyes of the law had been dropped by even the Young Turks long before that. The same Kemalists, who abolished the Caliphate, and whose leading men declared themselves to be religiously indifferent, now demanded that only Muslims work for the state and for the licensed companies. Brussa, which the student fraternity visited in July this year, had already been cleansed of Greeks as well as of Armenians. The wealthiest neighbourhood was empty, churches and schools were abandoned, the windows were broken, the furniture more or less destroyed." (Unless otherwise indicated all translations are made by the present author). On the persecution of Ottoman Jews, see e.g. Matthias Bjørnlund, "'When the cannons talk, the diplomats must be silent': a Danish diplomat in Constantinople during the Armenian genocide," *Genocide Studies and Prevention*, Vol I, No 2, 2006, pp 208–209.
- 9 Soner Cagaptay, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey* (London: New York, 2006), p 9.
- 10 Hilmar Kaiser, "The Ottoman government and the end of the Ottoman social formation, 1915–1917," 2001, available at <http://www.hist.net/kieser/ghet/Essays/EssayKaiser.html> (accessed August 2007); Nesim Seker, "Demographic engineering in the late Ottoman Empire and the Armenians," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol 43, No 3, 2007, p 463.
- 11 See e.g. Taner Akcam, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), pp 102–103, 111; Hans-Lukas Kieser, "Armenians, Turks, and Europe in the shadow of World War I: recent historiographical developments," in: Hans-Lukas Kieser and Elmar Plozza, eds, *Der Völkermord an den Armeniern, die Türkei und Europa/The Armenian Genocide, Turkey and Europe*, p 48 (Zürich: Chronos Verlag, 2006): "The fate of the Armenians in the context of total war does not appear as an isolated monolith: it is shown as a part of a puzzle—marking the tip of the iceberg—of state violence and coercion aiming at the construction of a Turkish ethno-nation in Anatolia, in opposition to other political projects. Thus the experiences of expelled or 'exchanged' Orthodox Ottomans (*Rum*) and massacred Assyrians/Syriac (*Süryani* and *Asuri*) as well as of resettled Muslims and *muhacir* (refugees of the Balkan and Caucasus as they were assimilated into the Turkish nation in Anatolia) are taken as parts of the broad picture."

- 12 Akcam, *GSP*, 2006, pp 133–134. See also David Gaunt, *Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim–Christian Relations in Eastern Anatolia During World War I* (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2006), p 65.
- 13 For uses of the phrase “ethnic cleansing” to describe these events, see Roger W. Smith, “Introduction,” in: Morgenthau, 2003, p xxxiv, and Halil Berktaş, “A genocide, three constituencies, thoughts for the future (part I),” *Armenian Weekly*, Vol 73, No 16, 21 April 2007, available at http://www.hairenik.com/armenian-weekly/gin042107_03.htm (accessed August 2007). According to Smith, 1973, p 31, the 1914 events were “not a ‘massacre’ in the sense of the Armenian or Bulgarian massacres, though numerous incidents of murder, destruction and rape took place. It was what the Greeks call a *diogmos*—persecution.”
- 14 Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story* (Wayne State: Wayne State University Press, 2003, 1st ed. 1918), pp 222–223; Taner Akcam, *From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide* (London and New York: Zed Books, 2004), p 147; Arnold Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey* (London, 1992, 1st ed. 1922), p 140; A. A. Pallis, “Racial migrations in the Balkans during the years 1912–1924,” *The Geographical Journal*, Vol 66, No 4, 1925, p 318. According to Van der Zee, some 70–80,000 Greeks were expelled before June 1914: UM, 5. L. 15., “Grækenland-Tyrkiet: Politiske Forhold,” pk. 1, No 41, 27/6, 1914.
- 15 *Nationaltidende*, April 19, 1914; April 26, 1914; May 19, 1914.
- 16 *Nationaltidende*, April 30, 1914.
- 17 Akcam, 2004, pp 144–149.
- 18 UM, 2-0355, “Konstantinopel/Istanbul, diplomatisk repræsentation. 1822–1920. Korrespondencesager vedr. Danske konsulater i Levanten 1864–1918,” pk. 27, “Oplysninger om danske konsultjæntmænd og om d. vicekonsulars [illegible] 1911,” 12/1, 1911.
- 19 *Ibid.*
- 20 UM, 2-0355, “Konstantinopel/Istanbul, diplomatisk repræsentation. 1822–1920. Korrespondencesager vedr. Danske konsulater i Levanten 1864–1918,” pk. 27, “Cons. de Danemark, Smyrne,” 31/3, 1910.
- 21 UM, 2-0355, “Konstantinopel/Istanbul, diplomatisk repræsentation. 1822–1920. Korrespondencesager vedr. Danske konsulater i Levanten 1864–1918,” pk. 27, “Oplysninger om danske konsultjæntmænd og om d. vicekonsulars [illegible] 1911,” 2/11, 1911. Members of the De Jongh family, merchant Oscar de Jongh and his wife, were killed by Turkish cavalry on September 9, 1922, on the first day of the destruction of Smyrna: *Daily Telegraph*, September 29, 1922, in Lysimachos Oeconomos, *The Tragedy of the Christian Near East* (London: The Anglo-Hellenic League, 1923), pp 7–8. See also George Horton, *The Blight of Asia: An Account of the Systematic Extermination of Christian Populations by Mohammedans and of the Culpability of Certain Great Powers; with the True Story of the Burning of Smyrna* (London: Sterndale Classics, 2003; 1st ed. 1926), p 85.
- 22 UM, 2-0355, “Konstantinopel/Istanbul, diplomatisk repræsentation,” “Noter og indberetninger om den politiske udvikling, 1914–1922,” “Verdenskrigen. Rapporter fra Smyrna. Nov. 1914–marts 1916,” 25/6, 1914. See also Horton, 2003, pp 28–34.
- 23 UM, 2-0355, “Konstantinopel/Istanbul, diplomatisk repræsentation,” “Noter og indberetninger om den politiske udvikling, 1914–1922,” “Verdenskrigen. Rapporter fra Smyrna. Nov. 1914–marts 1916,” 19/6, 1914; UM, 5. L. 15., “Grækenland-Tyrkiet: Politiske Forhold,” pk. 1, No 31, 23/6, 1914. On the importance to the CUP of regaining islands in Greek possession: Ahmed Djemal Pascha, *Erinnerungen eines Türkischen Staatsmannes* (München: Drei Masken Verlag, 1922), pp 17, 55, 111–112; William Peter Kaldis, “Background for conflict: Greece, Turkey, and the Aegean Islands, 1912–1914,” *Journal of Modern History*, Vol 51, No 2, 1979, pp 1119–1146; Henry Morgenthau, *United States Diplomacy on the Bosphorus: The Diaries of Ambassador Morgenthau, 1913–1916*, comp. and intro. Ara Sarafian (Princeton and London: Gomidas Institute, 2004), pp 19–20.
- 24 Michael Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor 1919–1922* (London: Allen Lane, 1973), p 32.
- 25 UM, 2-0355, “Konstantinopel/Istanbul, diplomatisk repræsentation,” “Noter og indberetninger om den politiske udvikling, 1914–1922,” “Verdenskrigen. Rapporter fra Smyrna. Nov. 1914–marts 1916,” 19/6, 1914. Quotes by Van der Zee, taken from reports that were written in English, have been silently edited.
- 26 Hans-Lukas Kieser, “Dr Mehmed Reshid (1873–1919): a political doctor,” in: Hans-Lukas Kieser and Dominik J. Schaller, eds, *Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah/The Armenian Genocide and the Shoah*, p 257 (Zürich: Chronos Verlag, 2002). After a conversation with Bedri Bey, chief of police of Constantinople, Morgenthau wrote in his diary on May 25, 1914 that he believed that the CUP aimed at expelling Greeks as well as Bulgarians, Serbs and Albanians: Morgenthau, 2004, pp 60–61. On July 2, 1914, he had a conversation with Talaat, who had seemed “determined to have Greeks of the country, not cities, leave their country”; *ibid.*, p 74.
- 27 See e.g. Ugur Ü. Üngör, “When persecution bleeds into mass murder: the processive nature of genocide,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention*, Vol 1, No 2, 2006, p 173.

- 28 UM, 2-0355, "Konstantinopel/Istanbul, diplomatisk repræsentation. 1914–1922. Noter og indberetninger om den politiske udvikling," "Verdenskrigen. Politiske Indberetninger om Tyrkiets Stilling, Juni 1917–Aug. 1918," No LXVII, 24/7, 1918.
- 29 Yannis G. Mourellos, "The 1914 persecutions and the first attempt at an exchange of minorities between Greece and Turkey," *Balkan Studies*, Vol 26, No 2, 1985; Ayhan Aktar, "Homogenising the nation, Turkifying the economy: the Turkish experience of the population exchange reconsidered," in: Renée Hirschon, ed., *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey*, p 83 (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003); Smith, 1973, pp 32–33; Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2001), p 43. Regarding earlier persecutions of Christians in Macedonia, see Marjorie Housepian, *The Smyrna Affair: The First Comprehensive Account of the Burning of the City and the Expulsion of the Christians from Turkey in 1922* (New York: Harcourt, 1971), pp 19–20.
- 30 Taner Akcam, "The Ottoman documents and the genocidal policies of the Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihat ve Terakki) toward the Armenians in 1915," *Genocide Studies and Prevention*, Vol 1, No 2, 2006, p 133.
- 31 Donald Bloxham, "Determinants of the Armenian genocide," in: Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., *Looking Backward, Moving Forward: Confronting the Armenian Genocide*, pp 29–30 (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2003).
- 32 Akcam, *GSP*, 2006, pp 134–135. See also Bjørnlund, *ibid*, pp 206–209. On the continued Turkification of Kurds and other non-Turkish groups in the 1920s and 1930s, see Cagaptay, 2006, *passim*.
- 33 UM, 139. D. 1., "Tyrkiet–Indre Forhold," pk. I, No II, 24/7, 1914. See also Bloxham, in Hovannisian, ed., 2003, p 28; Anahide Ter Minassian, "Van 1915," in: Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., *Armenian Van/Vaspurakan*, p 211 (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2000).
- 34 See e.g. Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent—Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic* (London: Hurst, 1997), pp 80–81; Christopher J. Walker, *Armenia—The Survival of a Nation* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1981), pp 188–195; Akcam, 2004, p 65.
- 35 Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p 163.
- 36 See e.g. Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey—A Modern History* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997), pp 132–137.
- 37 UM, 139. D. 1., "Tyrkiet–Indre Forhold," pk. I, No CLX, 22/9, 1915.
- 38 Ugur Ü. Üngör, "A reign of terror—CUP rule in Diyarbekir Province, 1913–1918" (unpublished MA thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2005), p 6.
- 39 Ronald Grigor Suny, "The holocaust before the Holocaust: reflections on the Armenian genocide," in: Kieser and Schaller, eds, 2002, pp 94–98; Bloxham, in Hovannisian, ed., 2003, pp 24–34; Üngör, 2005, pp 13–15, 17f.
- 40 Üngör, 2005, pp 20–21; Akcam, 2004, pp 138–139. On the connection between CUP linguistic policies and the subsequent genocide: Hilmar Kaiser, *Imperialism, Racism, and Development Theories: The Construction of a Dominant Paradigm on the Ottoman Armenians* (Ann Arbor, MI.: Gomidas Institute, 1998), p 28.
- 41 Akcam, 2004, p x; Robert Melson, "Provocation or nationalism: a critical inquiry into the Armenian genocide of 1915," in: Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., *The Armenian Genocide in Perspective* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1986), p 77.
- 42 UM, 139. D. 1., "Politiske Begivenheder i Tyrkiet i 1914," 26/1, 1915.
- 43 UM, 139. D. 1., "Tyrkiet–Indre Forhold," pk. I, No II, 24/7, 1914.
- 44 *Ibid*.
- 45 A consequence of the boycott was that Turks were not allowed to work for Christians: Morgenthau, 2004, pp 68, 70. On the closing of Orthodox Greek churches and schools as a protest against the boycott and persecutions, see *ibid*, p 70; UM, 2-0355, "Konstantinopel/Istanbul, diplomatisk repræsentation," "Noter og indberetninger om den politiske udvikling, 1914–1922," "Verdenskrigen. Rapporter fra Smyrna. Nov. 1914–marts 1916," 19/6, 1914. Regarding economic boycotts in the Ottoman Empire: Halil Inalcik, ed., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp 840–841.
- 46 UM, 2-0355, "Konstantinopel/Istanbul, diplomatisk repræsentation," "Noter og indberetninger om den politiske udvikling, 1914–1922," "Verdenskrigen. Rapporter fra Smyrna. Nov. 1914–marts 1916," 25/6, 1914. Most of the *muhadjirs* who settled in the Aegean region were not familiar with the climate or agricultural conditions of the area (many did not even speak Turkish), which, according to local governor of Chesmé, Hilmi Uran, quickly resulted in a significant deterioration of living standards: Aktar, in Hirschon, ed., 2003, p 84.
- 47 Caglar Keyder, "The consequences of the exchange of populations for Turkey," in: Hirschon, ed., 2003, p 45.
- 48 *Ibid*, p 51; Aktar, in Hirschon, ed., 2003, p 91.

- 49 *Nationaltidende*, April 29, 1914. See also *Nationaltidende*, June 20, 1914.
- 50 UM, 2-0355, "Konstantinopel/Istanbul, diplomatisk repræsentation," "Noter og indberetninger om den politiske udvikling, 1914–1922," "Verdenskrigen. Rapporter fra Smyrna. Nov. 1914–marts 1916," 19/6, 1914.
- 51 *Ibid.* On the sexual violence connected to the 1914 persecutions, see also Horton, 2003, p 32.
- 52 See also Smith, 1973, p 31.
- 53 On the background for the hundreds of thousands of *muhadjirs*, and their harrowing experiences in the Balkan Wars or in the Russian Empire, see e.g. Aktar, in Hirschon, ed., 2003, p 82; Smith, 1973, pp 30–31; Stephen D. Shenfield, "The Circassians: a forgotten genocide?," in: Mark Levene and Penny Roberts, eds, *The Massacre in History*, pp 149–162 (London and New York: Berghahn Books, 1999). For a Danish eyewitness to atrocities committed by Bulgarians against Muslim and Greek civilians in 1912: Franz von Jessen, *Mænd og Kampe paa Balkan* (Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 1913), pp 236–240.
- 54 UM, 139. D. 1., "Politiske Begivenheder i Tyrkiet i 1914," 26/1, 1915, p 17. For the estimated number of *bashibozuks*: UM, 5. L. 15., "Grækenland-Tyrkiet: Politiske Forhold," pk. 1, No 31, 23/6, 1914. On "Turkish hatred of Greeks," see also Morgenthau, 2004, p 68; Vahram Dadrian, *To the Desert: Pages from My Diary* (Princeton and London: Gomidas Institute, 2003), p 8, who relates that November 1914, on the day of the declaration of Jihad, a meeting was held in Chorum "to which the city's Greek and Armenian dignitaries were also invited. Those who spoke there insisted that there was no difference among Christians, regardless of their nationalities: they were all malicious enemies of the Turks."
- 55 UM, 2-0355, "Konstantinopel/Istanbul, diplomatisk repræsentation," "Noter og indberetninger om den politiske udvikling, 1914–1922," "Verdenskrigen. Rapporter fra Smyrna. Nov. 1914–marts 1916," 19/6, 1914.
- 56 Kieser, in Kieser and Schaller, eds, 2002, p 257. See also Smith, 1973, p 51.
- 57 See also *Nationaltidende*, April 2, 1914, on how thousands of Muslims had recently been expelled from Saloniki.
- 58 Kieser, in Kieser and Schaller, eds, 2002, p 257. Rahmi and other high-ranking radical nationalists like Talaat and Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) hailed originally from the Balkans. They had been radicalized by the loss of homeland and family members and were among the Young Turks most adamant on creating a new, ethnically homogenous homeland in Anatolia. For an introduction: Erik-Jan Zürcher, "Greek and Turkish refugees and deportees 1912–1924," 2003, available at <http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/tcimo/tulp/Research/ejz18.htm> (accessed August 2007). See also Akcam, *Shameful Act*, 2006, pp 85–87; Andrew D. Kalmykow, *Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat: Outposts of the Empire, 1893–1917*, ed. Alexandra Kalmykow (Yale: Yale University Press, 1971), p 253; Cagaptay, 2006, p 7.
- 59 Aktar, in Hirschon, ed., 2003, p 83.
- 60 Quoted in Akcam, *GSP*, 2006, p 133.
- 61 Kalmykow, 1971, p 258.
- 62 UM, 2-0355, "Konstantinopel/Istanbul, diplomatisk repræsentation," "Noter og indberetninger om den politiske udvikling, 1914–1922," "Verdenskrigen. Rapporter fra Smyrna. Nov. 1914–marts 1916," 25/6, 1914. On Muslim Cretan settlers before WWI: Sophia Koufopoulou, "Muslim Cretans in Turkey: the reformulation of ethnic identity in an Aegean community," in: Hirschon, ed., 2003, p 211.
- 63 UM, 2-0355, "Konstantinopel/Istanbul, diplomatisk repræsentation," "Noter og indberetninger om den politiske udvikling, 1914–1922," "Verdenskrigen. Rapporter fra Smyrna. Nov. 1914–marts 1916," 25/6, 1914. See also Smith, 1973, pp 31–32; *The Scotsman*, June 19, 1914; *Atlanta Constitution*, June 17, 1914; Harry Stürmer, *Zwei Kriegsjahre in Konstantinopel: Skizzen deutsch-jungtürkischer Moral und Politik* (Lausanne, 1917), pp 150–151.
- 64 UM, 2-0355, "Konstantinopel/Istanbul, diplomatisk repræsentation," "Noter og indberetninger om den politiske udvikling, 1914–1922," "Verdenskrigen. Rapporter fra Smyrna. Nov. 1914–marts 1916," 25/6, 1914.
- 65 *Ibid.* See also Morgenthau, 2004, p 71.
- 66 In Horton, 2003, pp 28–33.
- 67 See also *Nationaltidende*, June 8, 1914.
- 68 UM, 2-0355, "Konstantinopel/Istanbul, diplomatisk repræsentation," "Noter og indberetninger om den politiske udvikling, 1914–1922," "Verdenskrigen. Rapporter fra Smyrna. Nov. 1914–marts 1916," 25/6, 1914.
- 69 Aktar, in Hirschon, ed., 2003, p 83. A total of 18,000 Greeks had fled to Chios where they lived in the open, and the Greek authorities had great difficulties in providing for them. A total of 4,000 refugees had fled to the deserted island of Khunnil where they were dying of hunger: *Politiken*, June 24, 1914. See also *Manchester Guardian*, June 29, 1914.
- 70 Kieser, in Kieser and Schaller, eds, 2002, pp 257–261.
- 71 Aktar, in Hirschon, ed., 2003, pp 83–84.
- 72 UM, 2-0355, "Konstantinopel/Istanbul, diplomatisk repræsentation," "Noter og indberetninger om den politiske udvikling, 1914–1922," "Verdenskrigen. Rapporter fra Smyrna. Nov. 1914–marts 1916," 19/6, 1914.

- 73 According to the Danish ministers to Russia and Austria–Hungary, H. Scavenius and F. Lerche, a reason why the authorities halted the cleansing of Greeks was that the two Dreadnoughts that Britain had sold to the empire had not yet been delivered. Greece was still the superior naval power and the Ottomans were careful not to give Greece cause to declare war: UM, 5. L. 15., “Grækenland-Tyrkiet: politiske forhold,” pk. 1, No XV, 18/6, 1914; No XXVI, 18/6, 1914. See also *Nationaltidende*, June 13, 1914; June 15, 1914; June 19, 1914; *København*, June 17, 1914.
- 74 Aktar, in Hirschon, ed., 2003, p 83.
- 75 UM, 139. D. 1., “Tyrkiet—Indre Forhold,” pk. 1, “Politiske Begivenheder i Tyrkiet i 1914. Indsendt af Gesandtskabet i Konstantinopel 26/1 1915,” p 17; UM, 5. L. 15., “Grækenland-Tyrkiet: Politiske Forhold,” pk. 1, No 26, 19/6, 1914; UM, 5. L. 15., “Grækenland-Tyrkiet: Politiske Forhold,” pk. 1, No 28, 20/6, 1914. See also Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and Its Impact on Greece* (London: Hurst, 2002 [1962]), pp 53–54; Morgenthau, 2004, p 67; Kaldis, 1979, p 1138; *Nationaltidende*, June 15, 1914.
- 76 *Politiken*, June 22, 1914.
- 77 *Nationaltidende*, April 26, 1914.
- 78 UM, 5. L. 15., “Grækenland-Tyrkiet: Politiske Forhold,” pk. 1, No 26, 19/6, 1914.
- 79 Akcam, 2004, pp 146–147; UM, 139. N. 2., “Tyrkiet: Behandling af Grækere paa tyrkisk Omraade,” No X, 14/1, 1917.
- 80 UM, 5. L. 15., “Grækenland-Tyrkiet: Politiske Forhold,” pk. 1, No 13, 9/6, 1914.
- 81 Morgenthau, 2004, p 75.
- 82 UM, 5. L. 15., “Grækenland-Tyrkiet: Politiske Forhold,” pk. 1, No 41, 27/6, 1914. See also Akcam, 2004, pp 145–146.
- 83 *Nationaltidende*, June 19, 1914.
- 84 *Nationaltidende*, June 23, 1914.
- 85 UM, 2-0355, “Konstantinopel/Istanbul, diplomatisk repræsentation,” “Noter og indberetninger om den politiske udvikling, 1914–1922,” “Verdenskrigen. Rapporter fra Smyrna. Nov. 1914–marts 1916,” 25/6, 1914. See also Morgenthau, 2004, p 67.
- 86 Morgenthau, *Diaries*, 2004, p 70. See also Kalmykow, 1971, p 258. According to Kaiser, 2001, the drogman’s commission did in fact hold the government and the CUP responsible, helping to terminate the anti-Greek campaign.
- 87 *Nationaltidende*, June 14, 1914.
- 88 UM, 5. L. 15., “Grækenland-Tyrkiet: politiske forhold,” pk. 1, No 31, 23/6, 1914.
- 89 *Ibid.*
- 90 UM, 5. L. 15., “Grækenland-Tyrkiet: politiske forhold,” pk. 1, No 41, 27/6, 1914. See also *Nationaltidende*, June 18, 1914.
- 91 UM, 2-0355, “Konstantinopel/Istanbul, diplomatisk repræsentation,” “Noter og indberetninger om den politiske udvikling, 1914–1922,” “Verdenskrigen. Rapporter fra Smyrna. Nov. 1914–marts 1916,” attached to 15/6, 1914. The report contains information on a *corps consulaire* meeting held on the initiative of the *doyen* of the corps, Kalmykow, to assess the Greek persecutions.
- 92 Akcam, 2004, pp 92–96, 148.
- 93 Aktar, in Hirschon, ed., 2003, p 9.
- 94 UM, 5. L. 15., “Grækenland-Tyrkiet: Politiske Forhold,” pk. 1, No 41, 27/6, 1914.
- 95 Hirschon, “The consequences of the Lausanne Convention: an overview,” in: Hirschon, ed., 2003, p 16. See also Keyder, 2003, p 46; Aktar, in Hirschon, ed., 2003, p 81.
- 96 UM, 5. L. 15., “Grækenland-Tyrkiet: Politiske Forhold,” pk. 1, No 41, 27/6, 1914.
- 97 Morgenthau, 2003, p 232.
- 98 On “partial” and “total” genocide: Mark Levene, “Creating a modern ‘zone of genocide’: the impact of nation- and state-formation on Eastern Anatolia, 1878–1923,” *Holocaust & Genocide Studies*, Vol 12, No 3, 1998, pp 395–401, makes the argument that although the Armenian genocide like the Holocaust was a rare instance of total genocide (basically meaning that the scope, scale, and intensity of the killing is, if not unlimited, then with few limitations and exceptions), other aspects of the CUP homogenization campaign can be characterized as partial genocide. See also Robert F. Melson, *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp 2–4, 247–257.
- 99 Akcam, 2004, p 149; Morgenthau, 2003, pp 34–36; Hilmar Kaiser, “Armenian property, Ottoman law and nationality policies during the Armenian genocide, 1915–1916,” in: Olaf Farschid, Manfred Kropp and Stephan Dähne, eds, *The First World War as Remembered in the Countries of the Eastern Mediterranean* (Beirut: Orient-Institut, 2006), pp 51–52.
- 100 In 1917, the Ottoman press even announced that economic Turkification was in fact an “economic *Jihad*,” i.e. it was a national and a religious duty to work to achieve a Muslim Turkish-dominated economy:

- UM, 2-0355, “Konstantinopel/Istanbul, diplomatisk repræsentation. 1914–1922. Noter og indberetninger om den politiske udvikling,” “Verdenskrigen. Politiske Indberetninger om Tyrkiets Stilling, Juni 1917–Aug. 1918,” 21/6, 1917, p 33.
- 101 Kieser, in Kieser and Schaller, eds, 2002, pp 245–280. See also Üngör, 2006, pp 180–188; *ibid*, p 193, n86, on Ibrahim Bedreddin as another CUP official involved with the 1914 persecutions and with the Armenian genocide. Sükrü Bey, director of the Directorate for the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants, is another example of a “modern” (i.e. biological and eliminatory) racist Young Turk: Wolfgang Gust, ed., *Der Völkermord an den Armeniern 1915/16. Dokumente aus dem Politischen Archiv des deutschen Auswärtigen Amts* (Verlag zu Klampen, 2005), p 421.
- 102 Lewis Einstein, *Inside Constantinople: A Diplomatist’s Diary During the Dardanelles Expedition, April–September 1915* (London: John Murray, 1917), p 11. On the expulsions of Christians and Jews from the Bosphorus area May 1915, see pp 13, 19, 35, 44–45, 48, 58, 83–84, 171–172, 202–203, 210–211, 218, 220.
- 103 UM, 139. D. 1., “Tyrkiet–Indre Forhold,” pk. 1, No CLX, 22/9, 1915. See also Sarafian, comp., 2004, p 52.